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In late October of 1966, an imposing 
ship steamed quietly through the placid 
waters of the Suez Canal. Clad in drab 
industrial gray, and flying a Soviet 
hammer and sickle ﬂag at her masthead, 
the vessel was accompanied by a large 
ﬂeet of smaller craft. Any observer able 
to decipher Cyrillic script could have 
read, in rusting metallic letters on her 
bow, the name Sovetskaya Ukraina. 
The more experienced would perhaps 
have identiﬁed her as a whaling factory 
ship, traveling with her attendant ﬂeet of 
catcher boats and scouting vessels on a 
transit that would take them south into 
the Red Sea and beyond.
Although the whaling ﬂeet may have 
presented a noteworthy sight, Sovetska-
ya Ukraina’s passage through the Canal 
was nothing unusual. As far as anyone 
knew, she was bound once more for the 
great whaling grounds of the Antarctic, 
and was simply taking the shortest route 
there from her home port of Odessa on 
the Black Sea.
A few days later, however, as the ﬂeet 
entered the Gulf of Aden, it abruptly 
broke its southbound track. Unmarked 
by anyone except some local ﬁshermen, 
Sovetskaya Ukraina and her catchers 
turned to the northeast. As they cruised 
within sight of the desert coastline of 
Oman, the ﬂeet fanned out. On Novem-
ber 4th, they began to kill whales.
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A whaling ﬂeet engaged in the prac-
tice of whaling is hardly cause for com-
ment. What made these catches unusual, 
however, was that almost all of them 
were illegal.
Over the next two weeks, the vessels 
of the Soviet fleet swept the north-
western Indian Ocean. Their search for 
whales took them from Oman to the 
Gulf of Kutch off Pakistan, through 
offshore waters west of the Indian city 
of Bombay, and south to the Maldive 
Islands. By the time Sovetskaya Ukraina 
ﬁnally resumed her course for the Ant-
arctic on November 21st, her catcher 
boats had delivered more than three 
hundred whales to the huge ﬂoating fac-
tory for processing. Most of the animals 
had been either humpbacks, Megaptera 
novaeangliae, or blue whales, Balae-
noptera musculus, two species that 
were ofﬁcially considered “protected” 
under the international regulations that 
governed commercial whaling. 
When the Soviet ﬂeet reached the 
Antarctic, the pattern was repeated. 
Already-depleted and supposedly pro-
tected stocks of whales were plundered 
for several months until the onset of the 
austral winter. Finally, as the weather 
turned increasingly foul, the factory 
ship and her catchers began the long 
journey home.
In keeping with its obligations as a 
signatory to international whaling agree-
ments, the Soviet government dutifully 
reported that the Sovetskaya Ukraina 
ﬂeet had taken a total of 2,727 whales 
during the 1966–67 season, all of them 
“legal” species such as sperm, Physeter 
macrocephalus; ﬁn, Balaenoptera phy-
salus; and sei, Balaenoptera borealis; 
whales. The actual catch was 5,127—a 
difference of 2,400 whales. Nor was 
Sovetskaya Ukraina operating alone. 
Elsewhere, two other Soviet factory 
ﬂeets had taken a further 5,323 animals 
that went unreported. In a single season, 
7,723 whales had literally disappeared 
without a trace.
This was neither the ﬁrst nor the most 
productive year for illegal whaling. In 
just two Antarctic seasons (1959–60 and 
1960–61), Sovetskaya Ukraina (Fig. 1) 
and another ﬂoating factory, Slava (Fig. 
2), killed a staggering 25,000 humpback 
whales in the waters south of Australia 
and New Zealand.
This ﬂagrant disregard for interna-
tional agreement, and for the declining 
status of Antarctic whale stocks, was 
no renegade act of piracy by the com-
manders of the ﬂeets concerned. The 
illegal catches of that whaling season 
were simply the latest in a carefully 
planned ofﬁcial strategy that had been 
implemented almost 20 years before. 
Few people suspected it, but the Soviet 
Union had been plundering the world’s 
whale populations with abandon since 
1947. By the time that the illegal catches 
ﬁnally ended in 1973, the Soviets had 
killed probably over 200,000 more 
whales than they had ofﬁcially reported. 
And in the process, they had quite pos-
sibly succeeded in dooming at least one 
population of whales—that of the right 
whale in the eastern North Paciﬁc—to 
extinction.
The story of whaling in the twentieth 
century is largely one of excess. It is also 
a story of technology ﬁnally catching up 
with greed.
In Herman Melville’s day, whales 
were caught using methods that had 
changed little in centuries. Men set out 
in small boats and had to approach dan-
gerously close to a whale before hurling 
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Figure 1.—Soviet whaling factory ship Sovetskaya Ukraina (right) moored with her 
sister ship Sovetskaya Rossiya. They were the two largest whaling factory ships ever 
built. Year and photographer unknown.
a hand-held harpoon at the animal’s 
huge body. It was a risky business, 
and not very efﬁcient. Whales could 
escape. Boats could be overturned. And 
some species were simply too fast to 
be caught.
By the turn of the 20th century, two 
inventions had changed all this. Intro-
duction of the steam engine allowed 
men to hunt even the fastest whales. 
Species which had been out of reach 
of vessels powered solely by wind in a 
sail, or human strength applied to oars, 
were suddenly fair game. In particular, 
whalers could now easily catch the 
greatest prizes of all, the huge blue and 
ﬁn whales. At the same time, the inven-
tion of the explosive harpoon provided 
whalers with a means to kill whales 
more quickly and efﬁciently, and from 
a distance.
This revolution in whaling was 
completed with two more innovations. 
The compressor solved the long-stand-
ing problem of how to prevent whale 
carcasses from sinking: now, whalers 
could pump compressed air into a dead 
whale’s body to keep it aﬂoat. Finally, 
in the 1920’s, the factory ship was in-
troduced, freeing whalers from their ties 
to land. Factory ﬂeets could remain at 
sea for months, killing and processing 
large numbers of whales with grim ef-
ﬁciency. Whaling had ﬁnally come into 
the industrial age.
With timing that was ironically co-
incidental, the beginning of the 20th 
century also brought the discovery of 
the richest whaling grounds in the world. 
In 1904, whaling vessel captained by 
the Norwegian C. F. Larsen ventured 
into the largely unexplored waters of 
the Southern Ocean, and there the crew 
found whales beyond their wildest 
dreams. Feeding in the highly produc-
tive polar waters were huge populations 
of almost every commercially valuable 
species. Blue whales; ﬁn whales; hump-
backs; southern right whales, Eubalaena 
australis; sperm whales; and others 
abounded. Some of the blue whales 
exceeded 100 feet in length. For a while, 
it seemed as though this great bounty 
would have no end, and vessels ﬂocked 
to the bottom of the world to claim their 
share. Modern whaling had found its 
great playground, and a slaughter almost 
unparalleled in the history of wildlife 
exploitation was about to begin.
In the Southern Hemisphere alone, 
the whaling industry would kill almost 
900,000 whales over the next four de-
cades. By the end of World War II, it had 
become clear to even the most reluctant 
whalers that some sort of quota system 
was needed to prevent the commercial 
extinction of the world’s whale stocks. 
In 1946, the whaling nations—includ-
ing the Soviet Union—signed the Inter-
national Convention for the Regulation 
of Whaling. The Convention created the 
International Whaling Commission, a 
body which met annually to oversee re-
search on whale populations and to set 
scientiﬁcally based quotas that would 
theoretically balance the industry’s 
revenues with the need for long-term 
conservation of populations.
Not unpredictably, a process that 
was conceived as a necessarily good 
idea quickly fell victim to the desire 
for profit. Since whales are difficult 
to study, it was virtually impossible to 
obtain indisputable proof to support 
predictions of population crashes. There 
was frequently doubt, and its beneﬁt was 
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Figure 2.—Soviet factory ship Slava. Year and photographer unknown.
never awarded to the whales. During the 
1950’s, the whalers continued to slaugh-
ter their quarry in record numbers. In 
just 10 years, more than a quarter million 
ﬁn whales were killed in the Southern 
Ocean, together with tens of thousands 
of other whales.
By the end of the decade, virtually 
all objective scientists recognized that 
many whale populations were being 
exploited well beyond the limits of 
reason. Over the next few years, as 
Figure 3.—Yuri Mikhalev, Odessa 
2008. Photo by Phil Clapham.
catches declined and some populations 
received complete protection from 
hunting, it became clear that the Inter-
national Whaling Commission’s inten-
tion to oversee management based upon 
sustainable exploitation had fallen short 
of reality. As it turned out, the Soviets 
were secretly ensuring that this shortfall 
was considerably greater than anyone 
could have imagined.
Yuri Alexeich Mikhalev (Fig. 3) 
knows the truth about Soviet whaling 
better than most. In 1964, Mikhalev left 
Odessa on board Sovetskaya Ukraina, 
bound for the Southern Ocean. He was 
26. As a young biologist with a keen 
interest in marine mammals, Mikhalev 
viewed his employment as a valuable 
opportunity to conduct research using 
the many carcasses supplied by the 
whaling ﬂeet.
Mikhalev’s reality check began with 
his very ﬁrst whale. Some time after 
the ﬂeet had transited Suez, one of the 
catchers killed a Bryde’s whale, Ba-
laenoptera edeni, in the Gulf of Aden. 
Bryde’s whales are fast, sleek animals 
that live their lives (unlike other baleen 
whales) entirely in warm waters. They 
are so similar to another species, the 
sei whale, that distinguishing the two 
at sea is notoriously difﬁcult. Not so on 
the deck of a factory ship, where one 
has the leisure to examine an animal 
closely. The head of a Bryde’s whale is 
marked by three prominent ridges run-
ning lengthways down the top, a feature 
absent in any other species. Although 
Mikhalev had never seen a whale before, 
he had studied well and knew what the 
animal lying before him was.
To his surprise, the senior biologist 
on board recorded the catch in the of-
ﬁcial log as a sei whale. Mikhalev shyly 
drew the biologist’s attention to the 
head ridges and pointed to the descrip-
tion of Bryde’s whale in a book written 
by Avenir Tomilin, the most eminent 
of Russian whale biologists (Tomilin, 
1957). “Yes,” said the biologist, “but the 
KGB Commissar on board tells me I am 
to record it as a sei whale, so that’s what 
it’s going to be.” Only later did Mikhalev 
understand the problem with the Gulf of 
Aden catch. Since Bryde’s whales are 
not found in Antarctic waters, and since 
the ﬂeet was not supposed to be whaling 
anywhere else, reporting a catch of this 
species would raise suspicions.
The weeks that followed brought 
many more illegal catches, and Mikha-
lev gradually came to the realization that 
his country was engaged in a large-scale 
violation of whaling regulations. One 
day, he hesitantly broached the topic 
with the Commissar. “He told me that 
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Figure 4.—Alexei Solyanik. Photo 
by Yuri Mikhalev.
everyone was doing it,” says Mikhalev. 
“The Japanese, the Norwegians—every-
one. They were all breaking the rules. It 
was only much later that I found out this 
wasn’t true.”1
Mikhalev also discovered that, in ad-
dition to the “ofﬁcial” record of catches 
that was submitted to the International 
Whaling Commission, a second log 
was maintained as well. These secret 
logs gave the true catch data for each 
expedition, and many years later they 
were to prove instrumental in setting the 
record straight.
Because of the extent of the decep-
tion, security on board whaling vessels 
was tight even by Soviet standards. They 
rarely visited foreign ports, and when 
they did the crew was either conﬁned 
on board or sent ashore in groups of two 
or three, and always escorted. Mikhalev 
also recalls preparation for more extreme 
measures. One day he was standing on 
the bridge of Sovetskaya Ukraina as she 
sailed through the narrow straits of the 
Dardanelles off the Turkish coast. He re-
marked to the captain how close to shore 
they were and how tempting it might 
prove for someone to jump overboard 
and swim to land. “In that case,” replied 
the captain, “ I have orders to place the 
ship between the man and the beach so 
that he can be retrieved. And if that fails, 
I’m supposed to run him over.”
Mikhalev was on board Sovetskaya 
Ukraina during her 1966–67 season, 
and has unpleasant memories of the 
time spent in the northern Indian Ocean. 
“Conditions on board were terrible. It 
was incredibly hot, and the vessels had 
no good ventilation—they were built for 
the Antarctic, not the tropics. Everything 
smelled of diesel fuel and butchered 
whales.” Several men died as a result 
of the conditions, and another took his 
own life.
During that trip, the ﬂeet killed 238 
humpback whales in just ten days in 
the Arabian Sea. Mikhalev describes 
the merciless efﬁciency with which the 
1Actually, this is not strictly correct. Japan is now 
known to have falsiﬁed catch data on sperm and 
Bryde’s whales in their coastal ﬁshery, up to at 
least 1987 (Kondo and Kasuya, 2002). However, 
these illegal catches were never on the same scale 
as those of the U.S.S.R.
animals were hunted down. “Sovetskaya 
Ukraina had more catchers than any 
other factory ship—twenty-ﬁve. All the 
catchers would fan out into a long line, 
so that each boat was just within sight 
of the one on either side of it. When you 
saw the catcher next to you stopped, you 
knew that they had found whales. When 
that happened, everyone would converge 
on the spot, kill every animal in the area, 
then move on.”
Disturbed by this reckless pillag-
ing of a resource, Mikhalev and some 
other biologists took the courageous 
step of complaining to the authorities. 
Their response was to stop Mikhalev’s 
pay for 8 months. Nonetheless, he per-
sisted, writing letters to the Ministry 
of Fisheries. After several such letters 
with no response, he and his dissenting 
colleagues were one day summoned to 
Moscow and called before the minister 
himself, a man named Ishkov who 
was so inﬂuential that he was jokingly 
referred to as the “eternal” minister of 
Soviet ﬁsheries.
Mikhalev recalls Ishkov’s response 
to their concerns. “He said to us, ‘OK, 
I will stop this whaling tomorrow if you 
tell me what you will replace it with 
in the Five-Year Plan—how you will 
replace all the things we get from the 
whales now.’ Of course we couldn’t do 
that.” When Mikhalev suggested that 
the whaling would leave no whales for 
their grandchildren, the minister laughed 
grimly. “He said, ‘Your grandchildren? 
You talk to me about your grandchil-
dren? Your grandchildren aren’t the ones 
who can remove me from my job!’” 
A similar confrontation occurred 
some years later with the Vice-Minis-
ter for Fisheries, a man named Ritov. 
Ritov promised to set up a commission 
to investigate, but despite Mikhalev’s 
cooperation in providing incontrovert-
ible evidence of the falsiﬁcation of data, 
the commission turned in a watered-
down report that implicated no one. 
And Mikhalev’s career was essentially 
ruined.
As fruitless as these meetings were, 
they served to provide conﬁrmation of 
something they had all suspected: that 
the illegal catches represented ofﬁcial 
policy. Ironically, Vice-Minister Ritov 
would have bigger problems to worry 
about than Mikhalev’s grandchildren. 
Some years later, he was executed for 
corruption.
No one is more emblematic of the 
story of Soviet whaling, and no one 
more notorious, than Alexei Nikolaiev-
ich Solyanik (Berzin, 2008).2 Solyanik 
(Fig. 4) was by all accounts a ruthless 
man who rose quickly to prominence 
in the Soviet whaling industry, and his 
success at sea was such that he received 
numerous awards from the state, includ-
ing the much-coveted “Hero of Social-
ist Labor.” Solyanik was appointed 
the “General Captain-Director” of not 
one whaling ﬂeet, but two: Slava and 
Sovetskaya Ukraina, and with these 
huge ﬂoating factories he roamed the 
2Fred Berzin’s memoir (Berzin, 2008) devotes an 
entire section to Solyanik, with details of his rise 
to power, abuses, and eventual downfall.
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Southern Ocean and decimated popu-
lations of whales. It was Solyanik who 
was responsible for the huge catches of 
humpback whales—25,000 in just two 
seasons—which precipitated the crash 
of the populations concerned and forced 
the closure of shore whaling stations in 
Australia and New Zealand in the early 
1960’s (Clapham et al., 2009).
It was actually Solyanik himself 
who ﬁrst hired Mikhalev. He asked the 
young biologist if he had ever seen a 
whale. No, Yuri replied honestly, he had 
not. Solyanik sent him to sea anyway, 
at the minimum salary of 80 rubles a 
month. Mikhalev recounts the many 
abuses meted out on processing crews 
by Solyanik in his interminable quest 
for more “product.” He was notorious 
for driving the whale processing crews 
to exhaustion, even when whaling in 
the oppressive heat of the tropics, and 
several men died as a result.
Solyanik stopped at nothing to ensure 
that his production targets were always 
met and exceeded. In one case, he read 
Figure 5.—Solyanik and his wife Svetlana (Sveta) shopping 
during a port call in Sydney, Australia. Photo by Yuri Mikhalev.
Figure 6.—Yuri Mikhalev (right) and Svetlana Solyanik 
in Sydney; the man in the middle is unknown. Photo by 
Yuri Mikhalev.
of an impending whaling agreement 
between Japan and the Government 
of Argentina, and soon after took the 
Sovetskaya Ukraina ﬂeet to the waters 
of the latter nation. It was the spring of 
1962. There he found a large popula-
tion of southern right whales that was 
probably recovering well from 19th 
century whaling, and killed every 
animal he could ﬁnd. At other times, 
he intentionally gave false information 
to other Soviet whaling vessels regard-
ing allegedly good whaling grounds in 
order to ensure that the highest catches 
were reserved for his own ﬂeets. When 
the ships arrived, they found that the 
area had already been swept clean by 
Solyanik’s catchers.
Nor was Solyanik above blatant nepo-
tism. His son Gennady was appointed to 
the position of whaling inspector, thus 
creating a truly absurd situation: a man 
whose father was the worst plunderer 
of the world’s whales being responsible 
for making sure that whaling regula-
tions were followed. Solyanik even 
created an unnecessary but highly paid 
position aboard the factory ﬂeet for his 
attractive young wife Svetlana (Fig. 5). 
Not content with this, Solyanik even 
had a swimming pool constructed on the 
ﬂying bridge of Sovetskaya Ukraina for 
his wife to play in, a scene that infuriated 
the crews toiling below in unbearable 
tropical heat. Still, says Mikhalev (who 
knew Svetlana well: Fig. 6), people 
rarely complained about this or any 
other ﬂaunting of Solyanik’s power, no 
matter how egregious; everyone was 
afraid of Solyanik, and they all knew that 
any trouble-maker would be disciplined 
and sent home. It is a sad commentary on 
Soviet domestic life at the time that, as 
terrible as conditions often were on the 
ﬂeets, they were better (at least economi-
cally) than the alternative at home. The 
pay was better, the food was unlimited, 
and occasionally the ﬂeets would put 
into foreign ports where—under careful 
supervision—the men could go ashore 
for a few hours to taste another way of 
life, and to buy large quantities of much-
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coveted foreign goods to take back to 
the U.S.S.R.
Solyanik’s downfall began with the 
publication of a long and highly critical 
article in the prominent Soviet newspa-
per Komsomolskaya Pravda (Sakhnin, 
1965).3 The article detailed his many 
abuses of people and the system; and, 
while Solyanik had very powerful 
friends, even they could not ignore such 
a public display of his transgressions. 
After much infighting and political 
maneuvering (during which the career 
of the article’s author was effectively 
ruined), Solyanik was relieved of his 
elevated position in the whaling indus-
try, stripped of his many Communist 
Party privileges, and exiled to a lowly 
position in command of a ﬁshing vessel. 
His last years were spent in bitterness 
and paranoia. 
It is not entirely true that no one 
suspected what the Soviets were up to 
during all those years. For one thing, 
they themselves provided some clues. 
For example, the end of the 1950’s saw 
a strange paradox emerging: at a time 
when all the talk among whalers was 
of declining populations and of scaling 
back, the Soviets actually began adding 
factory ships to their Antarctic ﬂeet. 
For years, the Soviets also successfully 
blocked a scheme to place independent 
observers on whaling ships, an effort 
that is easy to interpret today.
And occasionally they made mis-
takes. Two notable errors involved what 
were known as “Discovery” tags. These 
were uniquely numbered stainless steel 
cylinders ﬁred from a shotgun into a 
whale to “mark” it (and named after the 
Discovery Committee, a British scien-
tiﬁc body which instituted the tagging 
program). The idea was that some of the 
marked animals would subsequently be 
killed, anywhere from the next day to 
many years later. When a tag was recov-
ered during the butchering process, the 
biologists could look at its number, con-
sult the records, and discover where the 
whale had originally been marked. Since 
they also knew where it had been killed, 
they would thus learn something about 
the animal’s movements. The recovery 
of many such tags could potentially 
provide valuable information about the 
structure and range of a population.
In 1962, the Soviets reported to the 
International Whaling Commission that 
they had recovered a number of Discov-
ery tags in the previous Antarctic season. 
Among them were tag numbers 15898 
and 21815, described as having come 
from a sperm whale and a ﬁn whale, 
respectively—both legal species at the 
time. Commission records, however, 
showed unequivocally that both tags 
had been ﬁred into humpback whales. 
Some people assumed that these mis-
takes represented simple transcription 
errors. An Australian biologist named 
Graeme Chittleborough took a rather 
less charitable view.
Chittleborough had worked for many 
years with the Australian whaling indus-
try and was then the foremost authority 
on humpback whale biology. In 1965, 
he published a scientiﬁc paper sum-
marizing extensive studies of two of the 
major humpback whale populations in 
the Southern Hemisphere (Chittlebor-
ough, 1965). Using his data to estimate 
mortality rates, Chittleborough observed 
that known catches of humpbacks were 
insufﬁcient to account for the very high 
rates suggested by his calculations. After 
considering various possibilities, he 
concluded that the only reasonable ex-
planation was that someone was taking 
large numbers of humpbacks illegally. 
Although he pointedly did not mention 
the country involved, Chittleborough 
cited the two Soviet Discovery tag 
“errors” as evidence that humpbacks 
were being taken and not reported.
Surprisingly, no one at the Interna-
tional Whaling Commission pursued 
Chittleborough’s accusations. When 
the truth was finally revealed, even 
Graeme Chittleborough was staggered 
by the scale of the illegal catches on 
humpbacks, which had been hit more 
heavily than any other species. Over the 
years, the Soviets had reported taking 
2,710 humpback whales in the waters 
of the Southern Hemisphere. The real 
total was more than 48,000.
Twenty-eight years after publication 
of Chittleborough’s paper, in December 
1993, Alexey Yablokov stood before 
a large group of marine mammal bi-
ologists at a conference in Galveston, 
Texas. Addressing the meeting’s con-
cluding banquet, he stunned his audi-
ence by revealing that the Soviets had 
engaged in massive illegal whaling for 
three decades. Yablokov, a respected 
biologist with a long history of research 
on whales, was then the Science Advisor 
to Russian President Boris Yeltsin. His 
speech was made possible only by the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union 4 years 
before. It also arose as the end result of 
a chance conversation.
In 1992, South African biologist 
Peter Best had bemoaned to a colleague 
that he was unable to publish a paper 
on southern right whale pregnancy 
because he had too small a sample size 
of fetuses from which to work. Right 
whales had been extensively hunted in 
previous centuries, and by 1900 were 
already considered comparatively rare 
in much of their historic range. Because 
the species had not been legally hunted 
since it was protected in 1935, biologists 
working on right whales had to rely on 
a small number of old whaling records, 
together with a handful of stranded 
specimens.
The colleague, Robert Brownell of 
NOAA’s National Marine Fisheries 
Service, mentioned Best’s problem to 
Yablokov one day. Yablokov’s response 
took him completely by surprise. 
“Alexey told me that he could give Peter 
some data on right whale fetuses,” says 
Brownell. “When I asked how many, 
the answer was several hundred.” Any 
biologist familiar with whaling regula-
tions would have been staggered by this 
number. For a species that had theoreti-
cally been protected for six decades, and 
hunted very little at all this century, the 
existence of data from several hundred 
pregnant females was almost inconceiv-
able. As it turned out, more than 3,000 
southern right whales had been killed, 
most by the whaling ﬂeets under the 
command of Alexei Solyanik.
Thus emerged the truth about Soviet 
whaling. Recognizing the critical im-
portance of setting the record straight, 
Brownell immediately began working 
with Yablokov to identify sources for 
3Fred Berzin’s memoir (Berzin, 2008: 30–35) 
contains the entire newspaper article.
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the true catch data. Although Yablokov 
was the one to ﬁnally break the silence 
(Yablokov, 1994), most of the details 
were furnished by other former Soviet 
whale biologists. Dimitri Tormosov, 
Fred Berzin, Vyacheslav Zemsky, and 
Yuri Mikhalev—a group Brownell jok-
ingly refers to as the Gang of Four—had 
all witnessed the illegal catches ﬁrsthand 
from the decks of factory ships. En-
couraged by Yablokov, they worked in 
various parts of the now-fractured Soviet 
empire to unearth the true catch data. 
Berzin, the former head of the marine 
mammal laboratory in Vladivostok, 
would later write a grim but fascinating 
memoir that provides extensive details 
of the Soviet whaling campaign. He died 
in 1996, but the memoir was recently 
translated and published in the Marine 
Fisheries Review (Berzin, 2008).
Ironically, the Soviet obsession with 
keeping accurate records of their catches 
is today helping biologists to better 
understand—and perhaps ultimately to 
better assist—the populations that were 
decimated during this reign of terror. 
Information from legal catches is highly 
biased because of the prohibitions on 
taking certain species, or ages, or sizes 
of whale. Thus the data sets are often in-
complete, and in some cases are of dubi-
ous accuracy. If a catcher took an animal 
that was below the legal minimum size 
limit, there was a powerful incentive to 
“add” a few feet to its true length and 
thus avoid costly ﬁnes. Because of the 
secret nature of Soviet operations and 
the fact that they killed everything they 
found, the resulting data have no such 
problems. Consequently, they can be 
used to address many questions that the 
legal records cannot.
Today, almost all of the Southern 
Hemisphere catch records have been 
corrected and published (Yablokov et 
al., 1998; Clapham and Baker, 2002). 
In addition, work is underway to obtain 
and analyze information on takes in 
the Northern Hemisphere. Although 
records are far more fragmentary, it is 
clear that the Soviets were far from idle 
north of the equator. Sperm whales in 
particular suffered greatly at the hands 
of Soviet factory fleets, with more 
than 200,000 estimated to have been 
killed; of these, more than 100,000 
may have been taken illegally. In all, 
Soviet illegal catches worldwide prob-
ably total well over 200,000 animals, 
and include several protected species. 
Almost half the Southern Hemisphere 
total were of humpback whales; but 
blue whales, sperm whales, sei whales, 
Bryde’s whales, and right whales were 
all killed in large numbers. Everything 
that crossed the bow of a catcher boat 
was taken: any species, and any size, 
from young calves to the oldest animals. 
In keeping with the spirit of the best 
communist philosophy, the Soviets did 
not discriminate.
During the 20th century, the other 
whaling nations together killed more 
than two million whales in the Southern 
Hemisphere alone (Clapham and Baker, 
2002). More than half of this total was 
made up of catches of the two largest 
species: 350,000 blue whales and a 
staggering three quarters of a million ﬁn 
whales were slaughtered for meat, oil, 
margarine, pharmaceuticals, and a host 
of other commercial products. So were 
160,000 humpbacks, 380,000 sperm 
whales, 180,000 sei whales, and around 
160,000 others. Add to this the innu-
merable whales killed in the Northern 
Hemisphere and you have a slaughter 
which, in terms of sheer biomass, is 
greater than anything in the history of 
human hunting.
Against this background of wide-
spread carnage, one might reasonably 
ask whether the 100,000 animals caught 
illegally in the Southern Hemisphere 
by the Soviet Union, representing just 
5% of the region’s total catch, made 
much of a difference to the populations 
concerned. A similar question could be 
posed with regard to the North Paciﬁc, 
where unreported catch totals (espe-
cially for sperm whales) may have been 
even larger. The answer, in at least some 
cases, is almost certainly yes.
For one thing, the bulk of the Soviet 
catches were made at a time when 
the populations of several species 
were already in serious decline from 
the excesses of legal whaling. In par-
ticular, humpback, blue, and southern 
right whales suffered the double blow 
of huge regular catches followed by 
extensive unreported Soviet takes. In 
the North Paciﬁc, sperm whales were 
so devastated by Soviet whaling, with 
reproductive females killed en masse, 
that one Soviet scientist noted that they 
had “left a desert in their wake” (Berzin, 
2008). At the very least, then, the illegal 
catches served to seriously inhibit the 
recovery of these populations.
Encouragingly, both humpback and 
southern right whales seem to be making 
a comeback in most places where they 
are being studied. In some areas, how-
ever, such as the waters off the island of 
South Georgia and around New Zealand, 
some previously abundant species are 
today represented by remnant popula-
tions (Clapham et al., 1999). Whether 
they will eventually recover is, at this 
point, anyone’s guess.
One population that may not is that 
of the right whale in the eastern North 
Paciﬁc. Right whales are indisputably 
among the rarest of all the world’s 
whales. Slow and easy to catch, and 
yielding a huge quantity of high qual-
ity oil and baleen, right whales were so 
named by early whalers simply because 
they were the “right” whale to kill. They 
were hunted in the North Atlantic as 
early as the 11th century, and just as 
intensively in the North Paciﬁc starting 
in the 1830’s. By 1900, northern right 
whales were already so rare throughout 
their range that they had ceased to be a 
principal target for whalers anywhere. 
Like their Southern Hemisphere coun-
terparts, they were completely protected 
from hunting by international agreement 
in 1935.
In 2001, a group of scientists includ-
ing one of us (PJC) undertook a review 
of all records of right whales in the 
North Paciﬁc this century (Brownell 
et al., 2001). The exercise revealed an 
alarming trend. Although right whales 
have never been numerous in the east-
ern part of this ocean during the 20th 
century, reasonable numbers were being 
sighted for many years. Whale catchers 
searching for other species reported 
seeing modest concentrations of right 
whales each year, particularly in the 
Bering Sea, the Aleutian Islands, and the 
Gulf of Alaska. Around 1964, however, 
a dramatic drop in sightings is evident. 
71(1) 51
Despite the fact that search effort actu-
ally increased, there were barely 60 
observations of right whales in the entire 
eastern North Paciﬁc from 1964 to 2001, 
when our paper was published.
In light of what we now know, it 
was not hard to guess the nature of the 
calamity that overtook the right whale 
population in the early sixties. Nor was 
it difﬁcult to interpret a large number 
of right whale “sightings” reported 
by Soviet whalers around this period. 
There, as elsewhere, the whalers went 
beyond mere observation of these ani-
mals and killed as many as they could, 
with disastrous consequences. Thanks 
to Nikolai Doroshenko, another former 
Soviet biologist, we now know that the 
U.S.S.R. killed 372 right whales, most in 
a 3-year period beginning in 1963 (Do-
roshenko, 2000). These animals, which 
were taken in the Bering Sea and Gulf 
of Alaska, probably comprised the bulk 
of the existing population (Ivashchenko 
et al., 2007).
In 1835, an American whaling ship 
named Ganges became the ﬁrst of her 
kind to arrive in the Paciﬁc Northwest, 
and there the awestruck captain reported 
seeing “a million right whales” (Webb, 
1988). While this was clearly a gross 
exaggeration, the statement is testament 
to the abundance of this species in the 
North Paciﬁc prior to the ﬁrst whaling 
catches. Less than two centuries later, 
the species is now so rarely sighted in 
the region that single observations have 
been publishable in scientiﬁc journals. 
We cannot be sure, but it is entirely 
possible that when the few remaining 
right whales in the eastern North Pa-
ciﬁc live out their lives and die, the 
species will be gone forever from these 
waters. Although Soviet whalers were 
certainly not responsible for the bulk of 
the catches on this population, they may 
well possess the dubious distinction of 
having effectively ﬁnished it off.
Sovetskaya Ukraina made her maiden 
voyage in 1959. Twenty-eight years and 
some 130,000 whales later, the old fac-
tory ship ended her life as a whaler and 
was converted to other uses. Finally, in 
1995 she was sold for scrap.
The demise of Sovetskaya Ukraina 
was attended by rather more sentimen-
tality than had been accorded the whales. 
Before leaving Odessa, the vessel was 
given a ceremonial farewell, and those 
who had worked aboard her were of-
fered souvenirs ranging from clocks to 
navigator’s rules to cartridge cases from 
the shells used to ﬁre harpoons.
Then, the ceremony over, Sovetskaya 
Ukraina was towed to a shipyard in 
Turkey (Fig. 7). There, in a ﬁnal irony, 
the vessel that had presided over the 
destruction of so many whales met a 
fate oddly like that of her longtime 
quarry. Under the blue light of acety-
lene torches, the decks that had once 
run with the blood of giants were 
themselves systematically carved up 
and disposed of.
If there is a lesson to be learned from 
this particularly shameful chapter of 
whaling history, it is that international 
agreements are essentially worthless 
unless accompanied by rigid provisions 
for inspection and enforcement. Today, 
there are insistent calls by Japan and 
some other nations for a resumption of 
commercial whaling, and this topic is 
hotly debated within the IWC (Clapham 
et al., 2007). One of the major issues 
revolves around the IWC’s “Revised 
Management Scheme,” the set of pro-
cedures and controls that would have 
to be established should the current 
moratorium on whaling be lifted. 
Within this debate, there are still 
many voices in the international com-
munity arguing that self-regulation is 
entirely adequate in environmental mat-
ters. Of the many images that one could 
summon to counter such assurances, few 
are as powerful as that of Soviet whaling 
ﬂeets, and 200,000 dead whales.
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